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Martin Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and 
European Variations on a Universal Theme. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005. 431 pp. (+x) ISBN 
0520242726. 
Reviewed by Richard J. Bernstein 
New School for Social Research 
Martin Jay introduces his masterful and ambitious study of the history of the 
concept of experience in modern thought by declaring: "'Experience,' it turns 
out, is a signifier that unleashes remarkable emotion in many who put special 
emphasis on it in their thought" (1). But why entitle the book "Songs of 
Experience"? Jay is aware of the apparent conceit in using this title of 
William Blake's poem cycle. But he intends it as an act of homage. "The 
temptation to borrow Blake's title is irresistible" because it perfectly fits his 
project: "[M]y intention is not to provide yet another account of what 
'experience' really is or might be, but rather to understand why so many 
thinkers have felt compelled to do precisely that. Many, if not all, have done 
so with an urgency and intensity that rarely accompanies the attempt to 
define or explicate a concept. Theirs has been, I hope to show, as much 
'songs' of passion as sober analyses" (1). 
When Jay speaks of his experience of writing this book, he draws upon one 
of the German words that are translated as 
"experience," Erfahrung(frequently contrasted with Erlebnis). Jay notes 
that Fahrt (journey) is embedded in Erfahrung, a word that is also linked 
with the German word for danger (Gefahr). Jay's journey is filled with 
unexpected turns, risks, and dangers. Jay is sensitive to the criticisms that 
have been advanced against the appeal to experience by such thinkers as 
Richard Rorty and Joan W. Scott. Scott, for example, claims that the belief 
that shared experience serves as the ultimate ground of cultural differences 
"undermines any attempt to explore the impersonal processes that construct 
the subject in the first place" (3). Despite her adamant denial of any 
foundational authority to the term, Scott declares that "experience is not a 
word we can do without, although given its usage to essentialize identity and 
reify the subject, it is tempting to abandon it altogether. But experience is so 
much a part of everyday language, so imbricated in our narratives that it 
seems futile to argue for its expulsion . . . . Given the ubiquity of the term, it 
seems to me more useful to work with it, to analyze its operations and 
redefine its meaning" (3-4). 
I want to outline Jay's project in order to orient a more detailed discussion of 
some of his songs of experience. He begins with a brief survey of the 
concept of experience from the Greeks to Montaigne and Bacon. In classical 
thought, the concept of experience played a relatively modest role. Jay's 
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adventure really begins with Montaigne and Bacon. Montaigne's reflections 
on experience may even be said to define one of the poles of modern 
discourse about experience. We find affinities between Montaigne and 
phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty (who greatly admired Montaigne), 
hermeneuticians such as Gadamer, and even such pragmatists as James and 
Dewey. Montaigne never attempts to define or "manage" experience. Rather 
he proceeds by anecdote, illustration, comparison, passing remarks: a 
"method" intended to illustrate the untidiness, the diversity, and the transient 
character of experience. Experience is filled with paradoxes, ironies, and 
disappointments. Montaigne exhibits a remarkable serenity in learning to live 
with contingency, uncertainty and ambiguity. But despite Montaigne's 
humanistic moderation, he was an "inadequate model for modern man at his 
most restless and ambitious . . . . [Modern thinkers] wanted to move into a 
world and scrutinize it instead in the hope of finding new and reliable 
knowledge that would help master what had hitherto been outside of human 
control" (28). Bacon and Descartes exemplified this new spirit. Experience 
for them is to be judged insofar as it contributes to or inhibits the 
advancement of genuine scientific knowledge. Jay observes that "[t]he 
scientific version, based on a transcendental, disembodied, immortal species 
subject located more in impartial instruments than fallible bodies, activated 
the etymological link . . . between experience and experiment, while 
suppressing the value of accumulated wisdom from the past." This sets the 
background for the epistemological concern with experience that dominated 
the eighteenth century. 
Jay traces the central debates about the cognitive understanding of 
experience in the works of Locke, Hume and Kant. It is against this 
epistemological background (frequently caricatured by subsequent thinkers) 
that the other modalities of experience were articulated. Jay then explores the 
attempts to characterize moral and religious experience (Schleiermacher, 
James, Otto, and Buber). He passes on to art and aesthetic experience ("From 
Kant to Dewey"); political experience (Burke, Oakeshott, and the English 
Marxists); and historical experience (Dilthey, Collingwood, Scott, and 
Ankersmit). 
After this exploration of the different specialized modalities of experience, 
Jay turns "to attempts made by a wide range of thinkers in the last century to 
heal what they lamented in the ruptures of experience and generate or 
recover a more holistic alternative, restoring -- at least to a certain extent -- 
the outlook of Montaigne" (39). In the second part of the book, Jay explores 
the debate about experience in the American pragmatic tradition (James, 
Dewey, and Rorty); the lament about the crisis of experience (Benjamin and 
Adorno); and finally, the poststructuralist reconstitution of experience 
(Bataille, Barthes, and Foucault). 
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The range of these songs of experience is breathtaking. Frequently, where we 
would like to pause in order to listen more carefully to nuances and shading, 
we are rapidly hurried on to the next cycle. But one can also begin to discern 
the dynamic overarching direction of Jay's journey. I would characterize his 
project as quasi-Hegelian -- and the qualifying "quasi" is crucial. Unlike 
Hegel, Jay disclaims any overall synthetic unity. There is no 
grand Aufhebung. Unlike Hegel, Jay does not want to suggest that each 
moment or stage in this development is integrated into the next stage. 
Nevertheless, we can discern a basic structure that bears a strong affinity to 
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. With Montaigne we discover the outlines 
of a holistic conception of experience. Structurally, this is like Hegel's 
invocation of the naïve holism of the early Greek Sittlichkeit and culture. We 
cannot remain satisfied with this naïve holism. There is a "necessity" to pass 
beyond it -- and this passing beyond leads to a process of diremption, 
fragmentation, and specialization. We also come to appreciate the one-
sidedness of the isolated modalities of experience. In the twentieth century, a 
variety of thinkers seek "to heal what they lamented as the ruptures of 
experience and generate or recover a more holistic alternative . . . (39). (The 
very language of "rupture," "healing," and "holism" owes a great deal to 
Hegel.) We, the readers, participate in this journey -- as we do with 
the Phenomenology of Spirit -- a journey that Hegel calls Erfahrung. Jay, 
like Hegel, seeks to bring forth the "truth" that is implicit in the changing 
conceptions of experience -- even when they are incompatible with each 
other. He enables us to appreciate the insights (and limitations) of thinkers as 
they struggle to articulate what they take to be most vital about experience. 
In a short review one cannot do justice to the richness of Jay's text, but I do 
want to give an example of one of his most illuminating song cycles, 
"Politics and Experience." We can see here the perplexities that break out in 
any attempt to give a satisfactory account of experience. Jay presents the 
challenge thrust in the face of those who appeal to a politics of experience: 
"A politics of experience," warns an eminent feminist critic, "is inevitably a 
conservative politics." Rather than a check against ideology, adds a 
prominent Marxist theorist, experience is "ideology's homeland." 
"Experience," observes a third commentator, was routinely elevated above 
"analysis" by defenders of "reactionary modernism" in Germany. (170) 
In a long tradition dating back to Burke (and even earlier), conservative 
thinkers have appealed to the funded wisdom of experience. They have been 
suspicious of abstraction, the appeal to universal principles -- and to what is 
frequently called "rationalism." But it is also true, as a matter of empirical 
fact, that there have been progressive and radical thinkers who have appealed 
to a politics of experience. There is another way of interpreting the claim that 
a politics of experience is necessarily conservative. Despite the "noble" 
intentions of progressive thinkers, the appeal to experience "inadvertently 
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produces conservative outcomes" (170). This accusation was made and 
debated with intense vehemence by twentieth-century English Marxists. 
Jay singles out the conservative thinker Michael Oakeshott, who is famous 
for his critique of "rationalism in politics." Rationalism, as he understood it, 
favors what is abstract and untested over the concrete wisdom of experience. 
Rationalism presents itself as enlightened, but it is politically dangerous: it is 
the source of most of the evils in modern and contemporary life. Oakeshott 
attacks the tradition that began with Bacon and Descartes because it 
instigated the pernicious faith in the "sovereignty of technique." His critique 
of "instrumental reason" echoes many of the arguments that we find in the 
left thinkers of the Frankfurt School. It also bears a resemblance to 
Heidegger's critique of Gestell (Enframing). Ironically, Oakeshott's notion of 
experience was given a progressive twist. Employing a concept of 
experience similar to Oakeshott's, Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson 
drew upon the radical political experience of the working class. Thompson's 
monumental The Making of the English Working Class transformed the 
writing of social history into a "history from below" and sought to "recover 
the lost experience of those forgotten by history" (196). Jay takes up the 
bitter fights that broke out between the "humanist" radical thinkers who 
appealed to political experience and the younger more "theoretical" 
generation (e.g., Perry Anderson and Terry Eagleton) who were influenced 
by the structural Marxism of Althusser. The "humanists" were accused of 
being fuzzy-minded "sentimental romantics," lacking analytic finesse and 
tough-minded theoretical rigor. They failed to grasp the way in which the 
appeal to experience is essentially ideological. Thompson's response was no 
less vigorous in its polemical attack on the "poverty of theory." Jay does a 
splendid job of summarizing the key moves and counter-moves in this 
intense debate. But it would be foolish to think that there was a clear victor 
in this battle. Williams and Thompson finally acknowledged some of the 
crucial ambiguities in the meaning of experience, and the grand theoretical 
claims made in the name of a "scientific" Marxism simply collapsed. 
What do we learn from this battle over the politics of experience? First, 
appeals to experience -- depending on historical context -- can be used to 
"justify" conservative and progressive options. Second, the "truth" implicit in 
the claims of the defenders of political experience (whether right or left) is 
that one can learn from the collective practical wisdom of accumulated 
experience. But there is also a "truth" in the arguments of those who claim 
that experience can harbor deep ideological prejudices and distortions that 
need to be brought out into the open and subjected to rigorous critique. 
Furthermore, we discover something that crops up in any attempt to do 
justice to experience: the need to preserve a proper tension between the 
subject of experience (the experiencing) and the object of experience (the 
experienced). Jay generalizes this point: 
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For as we have seen in the cases of cognitive, religious, aesthetic, and 
political experience, unless some sort of tension is preserved between the 
subject of experience and the object -- whether it be nature, God, things of 
beauty, or political goals -- there is a danger of losing precisely the very 
encounter with otherness and the moment of passivity that are so deeply 
embedded in the concept of experience in most of its guises. (221) 
In the second part of the book, Jay considers a variety of thinkers who 
attempt to overcome the fragmentation that resulted from the concentration 
of specialized modes of experience in order to develop an all-encompassing 
notion. He writes, "Hoping to recapture a more robust, intense, and all-
encompassing notion of experience -- whether it be called 'authentic' or 
'essential,' or 'pure' or 'inner' -- they sought to reverse the process of 
differentiation. Often betraying a sense of nostalgia for what had purportedly 
been lost by modalization, they hoped to make whole, reinvigorating a 
common life-world that had relinquished its coherent meaning with the 
development of subcultures of expertise" (263). At a very abstract level, one 
can see Jay's point. Yet when we turn to the details of his final three 
chapters, one seriously wonders whether twentieth-century thinkers have 
recaptured "a more robust, intense, and all-encompassing notion of 
experience." The best case for making this claim is to be found in the 
reconstruction of experience by the American pragmatists. 
One of Jay's most significant achievements is his recovery of the importance 
of the American pragmatic tradition. Pragmatism has been so badly 
caricatured that it is a pleasure to read Jay's insightful discussion. He 
understands that the heart of pragmatism is a rethinking and reconstruction 
of experience -- one that does full justice to its cognitive, scientific, aesthetic, 
religious, political and historical dimensions. Jay discusses the importance of 
James for our understanding of religious experience and Dewey's 
contribution to a balanced view of aesthetic experience. For Dewey there is a 
rhythm that is internal to what he called "having an experience": a rhythm 
involving a tension and a conflict that need to be resolved. If it is 
successfully resolved, then a new integration and wholeness are achieved. 
This consummation is what Dewey identifies as the aesthetic moment in the 
rhythm of experience. There is no ultimate finality, only a continuous 
dynamic rhythm. Aesthetic experience is not a special type of realm of 
experience. Rather it is a distinctive pervasive quality that can characterize 
any experience -- including scientific inquiry and practical activity. Dewey 
was particularly sensitive to the need to overcome the rigid epistemological 
and metaphysical dichotomy between subject and object that has plagued so 
much of modern thought. The distinction between what is subjective and 
objective arises within experience. Dewey's conception of experience can be 
viewed as a naturalized and pluralized version of the Hegelian conception 
of Erfahrung. Experience is the transaction of an agent-patient with its 
environment. The pragmatists integrate the passive, suffering, undergoing 
5
Bernstein: Bernstein on Jay
0
  
BRYN MAWR REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE, Volume 5 , Number 2 (Winter 2006) 
 
dimension of experience with its active, experimental aspect. Pathos 
(undergoing) and agency are inextricably related. They also maintain the 
creative tension between experiencing and the experienced. The pragmatists 
integrate the contingent fallible aspects of experience emphasized by 
Montaigne and the scientific experimental aspects of experience stressed by 
Bacon. They criticize the tendency of "empiricists" to substitute rarified 
abstractions for the dynamic pluralistic "muchness" of concrete experience. 
At the same time, they take seriously the active, intervening, experimental 
character of experience. (Dewey favored the term "experimentalism" as a 
description of his philosophical position.) Furthermore, the pragmatists 
appreciate the historical shaping of experience as well as its political 
dimension. This is evident in the way in which Dewey, for example, sought 
to democratize experience. 
When we turn to Jay's discussion of Benjamin and Adorno, we seem to be in 
an entirely different world. They were preoccupied with the "crisis of 
experience": the loss of "real" experience in the modern world. Jay's 
discussion of Benjamin is a tour de force. With deftness, subtlety, and 
nuance, he succinctly follows the twists and turns of Benjamin's "obsession" 
with experience from his earliest writings through the posthumous Arcades 
Project. But one may seriously question Jay's claim that Benjamin and 
Adorno elaborate an "all-encompassing notion of experience." Despite the 
fact that Benjamin kept returning, extending, and critiquing Kant (just as 
Adorno did with Hegel), there is scarcely any serious concern with 
integrating the cognitive scientific dimensions of experience into their 
understanding of the concept. Indeed, it was the presumably promiscuous 
development of science and technology that brought about the "crisis of 
experience." 
In his final song cycle, "The Poststructuralist Reconstitution of Experience," 
Jay does a splendid job of showing that these thinkers do not abandon 
experience in favor of the linguistic turn. Rather they seek to reconstruct the 
concept of experience without a subject. Bataille speaks of "inner 
experience," which we might normally construe as "subjective" experience. 
But paradoxically, it means something radically different: "willingness to 
live life as a radical experiment, involving the body as well as the mind, 
risking danger in the quest for a certain version of redemption" (370). 
Bataille is obsessed with extremes: suffering, pain, ecstasy, rapture, and self-
immolation. Foucault takes up Bataille's theme of transgression. But there 
are also unresolved tensions between Foucault's flirtation with "limit-
experiences" and writing the "history of truth." Foucault succinctly 
characterizes his complex project in a late interview: 
I have taken pains to understand how man had reduced some of his limit-
experiences to objects of knowledge (connaissance): madness, death, and 
crime. Here, if you like, the themes of George Bataille may be recognized, 
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reconsidered from the point of view (optique) of a collective history, that of 
the West and its knowledge (savoir). The relationship between limit-
experiences and the history of truth: I am more or less imprisoned or 
wrapped up in this tangle of problems. (399) 
Jay shows just how central this concept of "experience without a subject" is 
for these French thinkers. But his claim that they are engaged in the project 
of overcoming the earlier modalization of experience and are seeking a new 
holistic conception is unpersuasive. They emphasized very selective and 
idiosyncratic aspects of experience. I doubt whether Montaigne would even 
have recognized what Bataille and Foucault mean by the term. Their 
emphasis on extremes, limits, and transgression is antithetical to the spirit of 
his balanced and judicious understanding of the contingency of experience. 
I do not know of any other study that seeks to be as comprehensive and as 
exhaustive as this one. Jay has a rare ability to treat the most varied ideas 
with delicacy and hermeneutical generosity. It is a stunning achievement. 
And yet, it is not completely satisfying, in part because of its ambition. Jay 
covers too much ground. For all its alleged comprehensiveness, one comes 
away with a sense of incompleteness. Many aspects and ways of thinking of 
experience are simply not treated here. With few exceptions, Jay does not 
deal with the way in which poets, novelists, and artists think about it. Major 
figures such as Wittgenstein and Husserl, who have changed the way we 
think about it, tend to be marginalized. It is perplexing too why Freud -- and 
more generally psychoanalysis, which has transformed our understanding of 
experience -- is never thematized. There are limits to what can be covered in 
a single book. But the main problem is that Jay's principle of selection -- 
what does and what does not get discussed -- is never entirely clear. 
Paradoxically, there is too little history here. In his introduction, Jay tells us 
that because his "cast of characters" is so large he cannot make a sustained 
attempt to contextualize the origin and development of their ideas. But he 
pays a heavy price for this limitation. We do not have much sense of what 
historical factors influenced these thinkers. Intellectual historians are 
confronted with twin dangers. There is a danger of reductionism, of treating 
ideas in an oversimplified and distorted manner and of accounting for them 
by appeal to historical variables in a crude manner. This is not a danger that 
even tempts Jay. But there is the opposing danger of abstracting ideas from 
the thickness of history -- social, political and cultural. Jay is aware of this 
danger, but by covering so much ground he has to sacrifice detailed 
historical contextualization for conceptual analysis. 
I also think that questions may be raised about Jay's developmental tripartite 
structure: Montaigne's holism; the modalization and fragmentation of 
experience; the development of a more robust holism that overcomes the 
modalization of experience. As Jay himself indicates, early in the nineteenth 
century, Hegel had a deep sense of the fragmentation of experience, and he 
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sought -- in a more ambitious way than any previous thinker did -- to 
develop an all-encompassing robust conception of Erfahrung. We find the 
yearning for holism concurrent with the modalization of experience. And this 
continues right up to the present. 
At the beginning of his book Jay declares: "'Experience,' of all the words in 
the philosophic vocabulary is the most difficult to manage;' warns Michael 
Oakeshott . . . " (9). Jay discovers just how difficult it is to manage 
"experience." A skeptical reader might come away with the feeling that 
"experience" is not just difficult to manage, but is a signifier that can take on 
the most diverse conflicting and contradictory meanings. Perhaps it would be 
best if we could drop the term altogether. But there is another moral that can 
be drawn from Jay's exciting and perilous journey, the one that I think Jay 
wants us to draw (and which I share). Despite the protean quality of 
"experience," it has a power, a passionate intensity and a lure that are 
irresistible. Like the return of the repressed, experience has the dynamic 
power of returning in ever-new guises. We cannot escape from appealing to 
experience (in one of its multiple and changing shapes) in our irrepressible 
attempts to make sense of our being-in-the-world. 
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